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Professional Responsibility
Warren L. Mengis*
Introduction
For at least two decades there have been many complaints against
the disciplinary procedure activated by the receipt by the State Bar
Association of a complaint or grievance against a particular lawyer.
Virtually all of the critics make one of the following complaints: it takes
too long, it is too secretive, it is too protective of the lawyer, and
punishment, if any, is too lenient. On Monday, July 2, 1990, the Wall
Street Journal carried an article entitled "State Bar Groups Toughen
Discipline for Lawyers Despite Their Objections." Six states were fea-
tured in the article: California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York,
and Texas. Louisiana may now be added to the states which are at-
tempting to streamline and improve the disciplinary procedures. The
Louisiana Supreme Court, by court rule that took effect on April 1,
1990, adopted a set of regulations that closely follow the American Bar
Association's 1989 Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement.
Some of the more important innovations and changes are discussed
below.
Advertising and Solicitation
One of the few things a state can still ban is direct person-to-person
solicitation for pecuniary gain. Louisiana rule 7.3 provides succinctly
that a lawyer shall not solicit professional employment in person, by
person-to-person telephone contact, or through others acting at his re-
quest from a prospective client to whom the lawyer has no family or
prior professional relationship when a significant motive for the lawyer
doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain.' It is common knowledge,
however, that a great deal of this type of solicitation goes on although
usually the lawyer will use a third person as his "runner." Such was
apparently the case in the Iberia Parish case of Vidrine v. Abshire.2
The trial judge stated:
Copyright 1990, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. La. R.S. 37 ch. 4 app. art. 16, rule 7.3 (Supp. 1990).
2. 558 So. 2d 288 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990).
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This is a strange case indeed. Here we have an illiterate
man who has a case handled by a law firm, and then he receives
money in big figures for running cases, and apparently even
borrows bigger amounts with the endorsement of the plaintiffs.
None of these strange, fishy arrangements have been explained.'
The appellate court agreed that something was apparently rotten in
South Louisiana and refused to enforce a debt owed by the runner to
the law firm because it was inextricably bound to the "running" contract.
The preliminary injunction of the executory proceedings granted by the
trial court was upheld.
In the course of its opinion, the appellate court cited Louisiana
Revised Statutes 37:213 and 37:219. In pertinent part these articles
provide:
37:213. No person, partnership or corporation shall solicit em-
ployment for a legal practitioner.
37:219(A). It shall be unlawful for any attorney to pay money
or give any other thing of value to any person for the purpose
of obtaining representation of any client.
Both the trial court and the court of appeal cited the ethical rule
that a lawyer should not enter into a business transaction with a client
if they have differing interests therein. However, the more pertinent rule
seems to be 7.3, which is cited above. It is no defense that the lawyer
did not make contact himself, as a lawyer cannot circumvent this dis-
ciplinary rule through the action of another, such as an employee.'
The United States Supreme Court, in a five to four decision entitled
Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission,' cast consid-
erable doubt on at least a portion of Louisiana's rule 7.4 which deals
with communication of fields of practice. This rule prohibits a lawyer
from stating or implying that a lawyer is a specialist unless he has been
recognized as a specialist under a plan approved by the Louisiana State
Bar Association. As most readers know, the only such plan that has
been approved is the one for lawyers specializing in taxation.
In Illinois, Mr. Gary Peel included the following on his professional
letterhead:
Gary E. Peel
Certified Civil Trial Specialist
By The National Board of Trial Advocacy
Licensed: "Illinois, Missouri, Arizona"
At the time, Illinois had no approved specialties other than Admiralty,
3. Id. at 292.
4. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Edwins, 329 So. 2d 437 (La. 1976).
5. 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990).
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Trademark, and Patent Law. The administrator of the Attorney Reg-
istration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois filed a complaint against
Mr. Peel and after a hearing recommended a censure. This recommen-
dation was approved by the Illinois Supreme Court but a writ of
certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court and the
judgment from the Illinois Supreme Court was reversed and the case
remanded.
The Court, speaking through Justice Stevens, formulated the issue
as whether a lawyer has a constitutional right, under the standards
applicable to commercial speech, to advertise his or her certification as
a trial specialist by the National Board of Trial Advocacy (NBTA). To
resolve the issue, the Court had to determine whether Mr. Peel's state-
ment was misleading and even if it was not, whether the potentially
misleading character of such statements creates a state interest sufficiently
substantial to justify a categorical ban on their use. Louisiana, like
many other states, has this categorical ban unless the specialty plan is
approved by the Louisiana State Bar Association. The Illinois Supreme
Court had not focused on the accuracy or inaccuracy of the statement
on Mr. Peel's letterhead, but rather that it amounted to and implied a
claim of the quality of Mr. Peel's legal services and was therefore likely
to mislead. This likelihood of misleading had then justified the categorical
ban for' the Illinois court.
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, focused on the accuracy
of Mr. Peel's statement. It concluded:
A lawyer's certification by NBTA is a verifiable fact, as are
the predicate requirements for that certification. Measures of
trial experience and hours of continuing education, like infor-
mation about what schools the lawyer attended or his or her
bar activities, are facts about a lawyer's training and practice.
A claim of certification is not an unverifiable opinion of the
ultimate quality of a lawyer's work or a promise of success,
but is simply a fact, albeit one with multiple predicates, from
which a consumer may or may not draw an inference of the
likely quality of an attorney's work in a given area of practice.6
Interestingly enough, a majority of the Court, through concurrences
and dissenting opinions, concluded the statement was in fact potentially
misleading and, therefore, the state could actually require Mr. Peel to
furnish additional information or in lieu thereof forbid the use of the
statement.
Justice O'Connor, dissenting, concluded that the state is in a better
position to determine whether or not a statement is inherently or po-
6. Id. at 2288 (citations omitted).
19901
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tentially misleading and, therefore, the United States Supreme Court
should be more deferential to the state's experience with such statements.
It is not likely that the Supreme Court of the United States will do
anything but give lip service to this idea that the states should control
the ethical behavior of lawyers while continuing to expand the first
amendment rights of lawyers in connection with commercial speech.
Malpractice
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Penalber v. Blount,7 clarified to
some extent the various issues in malpractice litigation. First and fore-
most, the court unequivocally held that ordinarily a lawyer owes no
legal duty to his client's adversary when acting in his client's behalf.
Not even the rules of professional conduct create actual duties for
negligent injury of a client's adversary or negligent breach of professional
obligations which might run in favor of his client's adversary. To some
extent this holding limits the fourth circuit's unreported opinion in Shaw
v. Everett.8 For a complete discussion of the Shaw case, the reader is
referred to last year's faculty symposium.9 If, however, the action of
the attorney is intentionally tortious, even though ostensibly performed
for a client's benefit, the attorney may be held personally accountable
by the injured adversary.
In Leonard v. Smith,'0 the plaintiff coupled malpractice with def-
amation. He contended that his brother's attorney had failed to carry
out an agreement which was agreed to by both brothers and their
attorneys. The failure to carry out this agreement, said the plaintiff,
damaged the plaintiff to the extent of a much harsher sentence. In
addition, the plaintiff contended that a letter which had been written
by his brother's attorney to the district attorney had defamed the plain-
tiff. The second circuit first concluded that nowhere had plaintiff alleged
any type of attorney-client relationship between him and the attorney
sued, who was actually his brother's attorney. The court then concluded,
in perfect harmony with Penalber, that no cause of action for malpractice
had been stated.
As to the defamation, the court discussed the qualified privilege
enjoyed by attorneys regarding the pleadings and briefs which they filed
in judicial proceedings. Without holding that the defendant attorney was
guilty of defamation, the court concluded that, in any event, he would
7. 550 So. 2d 577 (La. 1989).
8. No. CA-8615 (La. App. 4th Cir. March 10, 1988), writ denied, 531 So. 2d 272,
275 (1988).
9. Mengis, Developments in the Law, 1988-1989, Professional Responsibility, 50 La.
L. Rev. 335, 342 (1989).
10. 550 So. 2d 729 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
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be protected by the qualified privilege. "A free exchange of views under
these circumstances serves the social interests of the public and the
courts.""II
The fourth circuit in Miskell v. Ciervo, 2 in discussing the same
subject, reiterated the necessity for the qualified privilege but reminded
attorneys that they did not have the right to make outlandish and
unwarranted statements nor deliberate false statements. In addition, they
may be held liable for statements if those statements are not pertinent
to the case or are made maliciously or without reasonable basis.
Two malpractice decisions dealt with proving whether an attorney
has fallen below the standard, enunciated in Ramp v. St. Paul Fire and
Marine Insurance Co.,"3 that an attorney is obligated to exercise at least
that degree of care, skill, and diligence exercised by prudent attorneys
practicing in his community or locality. In Morgan v. Campbell, Camp-
bell & Johnson,4 the court was confronted with whether' or not an
attorney was negligent when he did not make certain that the mortgage
which covered both immovables and movables was recorded in the chattel
mortgage records as well as the regular mortgage records. Since neither
side had. introduced any testimony concerning the standard of care of
attorneys in the defendant's locality when filing an instrument containing
two different types of property, the court concluded that a summary
judgment in favor of the attorney was inappropriate and remanded the
case. In Richards v. Cousins,"5 the attorney had been asked to prepare
a sale from parents to daughter and a counter letter indicating that the
sale was a simulation. Later, the daughter mortgaged the property which
eventually led to a sale to avoid foreclosure. The malpractice question
was whether or not the attorney had sufficiently explained to the parents,
one of whom had died in the interim between the transfer and the sale
to avoid foreclosure, the full impact of the simulation and the risk
involved. Expert' testimony by an expert in real estate law in the city
of New Orleans was to the effect that Mr. Cousins had failed to explain
properly the impact of what was being done and that constituted neg-
ligence.
The inadvisability of attorneys holding themselves out as partners
when they are in fact only sharing office space is brought out in Gravois
v. New England Insurance Co.16 Apparently Mr. Longenecker, an at-
torney, had been guilty of some fraudulent conduct and the injured
party was seeking to obtain redress from Mr. Wegmann, another attorney
11. Id. at 733.
12. 557 So. 2d 274 (La. Apo. 4th Cir. 1990).
13. 263 La. 774, 269 So. 2d 239 (1972).
14. 561 So. 2d 926 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
15. 550 So. 2d 1273 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 552 So. 2d 397 (1989).
16. 553 So. 2d 1034 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
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with whom Mr. Longenecker shared an office. For some time the two
attorneys used office stationery which bore the heading "Wegmann and
Longenecker.". The same name was on their office door and in the
telephone directory. In addition, Martindale-Hubbell carried the same
firm name, and they had obtained professional malpractice insurance
in that name. Both attorneys nevertheless gave sworn affidavits that
they had never actually been in partnership and had never shared profits
and losses, which is an essential element to any partnership.
Louisiana's rule 7.5(d) specifically prohibits lawyers from stating or
implying that they practice in partnership or other organization unless
that is the fact. Letterheads, office signs, and telephone directories tend
to mislead prospective clients and others when the implied partnership
does not in fact exist. The court concluded in Gravois that the evidence
failed to establish a partnership.
In the Gravois case, as in Montgomery v. Jack,17 the court again
stated the prescriptive periods for malpractice. Normally malpractice
sounds in tort and is subject to the one year prescriptive period from
the date the injury occurs unless the attorney has guaranteed some
particular result, in which case the prescriptive period is ten years. Act
683 of the 1990 regular legislative session, which will become Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:5605, now regulates the prescription which is appli-
cable to actions for legal malpractice. The action must be brought within
one year from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect, or
within one year from the date that the alleged act, omission, or neglect
is discovered or should have been discovered. However, in all events
such actions shall be filed at the latest within three years from the date
of the alleged act, omission, or neglect.
Finally, in Delta Process Equipment Inc. v. New England Insurance
Co.,"8 the court concluded that a malpractice action based upon the
failure to file timely a patent application could be brought in either the
state or federal court as such action was not subject to exclusive federal
jurisdiction.
Attorney Fees
Attorney fees are subject to review and control by the court. Nothing
is more firmly settled in Louisiana. It makes no difference that the fee
was set in a contract 19 or by statute, 20 whether the fee is contingent
upon recovery2' or is an hourly charge. The bottom line has got to be
17. 556 So. 2d 267 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 559 So. 2d 1377 (1990).
18. 560 So. 2d 923 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990).
19. Leenerts Farms, Inc. v. Rogers, 421 So. 2d 216 (La. 1982).
20. City of Baton Rouge v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 500 So. 2d 397 (La. 1987).
21. Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Products, Inc., 373 So. 2d 102 (La. 1979); Skidmore v.
Bengal Flyers, Inc., 546 So. 2d 568 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989).
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in accord with Louisiana's rule 1.5 which begins with the sentence, "A
lawyer's fee shall be reasonable.' '22
The evolution of judicial scrutiny of attorney fees is explained in
Esteve v. Longo.23 The question in Esteve was whether a second mortgage
holder who intervened in the first mortgage holder's executory process
with its own petition for executory process could contest the reasona-
bleness of the fee stipulated in the promissory note held by the first
mortgagee. The court concluded that the second mortgagee could in fact
contest the reasonableness of the fee since a variance in that item would
certainly affect the amount of recovery that the second mortgagee could
expect. The matter was remanded to the trial court for a hearing to
determine the reasonableness of the fee.
The remand brings up a practical problem. Should the courts be in
the business of setting legal fees? For many years the Louisiana State
Bar Association refused to accept fee complaints because of the many
factors which went into the setting of a reasonable fee. It was only
those situations where the fee was obviously excessive that a complaint
would be accepted. Both the fourth circuit 24 and the third circuit 25 have
stated an intention to limit their review to those situations where there
is a "clearly excessive fee" involved. A fee is clearly excessive when it
is so grossly out of proportion with fees charged for similar services
by other attorneys in the locale as to constitute an unquestionable abuse
of the attorney's professional responsibility to the public.26
In 1979, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in Saucier v. Hayes Dairy
Products, Inc.,27 held that the contingent fee statute, Louisiana Revised
Statutes 37:218, could only be constitutional if construed so as to give
a privilege to attorneys for their fees rather than to permit them to
take an interest in their clients' causes of action. In Calk v. Highland
Construction & Manufacturing,2 the court held that the statute grants
the attorney a privilege only to the extent of his fee. Consequently,
advances which are in the nature of a loan, payment of the client's
medical bills, and other out-of-pocket expenses are not covered by the
privilege. Act 78 of 1989 amended Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5001
and 37:218, both of which relate to the privilege securing attorney fees
by defining "professional fees," which is used in Louisiana Revised
22. La. R.S. 37 ch. 4 app. art. 16, rule 1.5 (1988).
23.' 549 So. 2d 316 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
24. Gibson v. Burns, 505 So. 2d 66 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987).
25. Desselle v. Moreauville State Bank, 553 So. 2d 1067 (La. App..3d Cir. 1989),
writ denied, 558 So. 2d 584 (1990).
26. Gibson, 505 So. 2d at 69.
27. 373 So. 2d 102 (La. 1979).
28. 376 So. 2d 495 (La. 1979).
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Statutes 9:5001, and "fee," which is used in Louisiana Revised Statutes
37:218.
9:5001(B). The term "professional fees," as used in this Section,
means the agreed upon fee, whether fixed or contingent, and
any and all other amounts advanced by the attorney to or on
behalf of the client, as permitted by the Rules of Professional
Conduct of the Louisiana State Bar Association.
37:218(B). The term "fee," as used in this Section, means the
agreed upon fee, whether fixed or contingent, and any and all
other amounts advanced by the attorney to or on behalf of the
client, as permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct of
the Louisiana State Bar Association.
Apparently, advances for humanitarian expenses approved in Louis-
iana State Bar Association v. Edwins29 now can be included as a part
of the "fee" for privilege purposes. It will be interesting to see whether
or not the courts permit the legislature to define professional fees in
such a way as to include those things which are clearly not.
It has been the opinion of the writer that sooner or later the
Louisiana Supreme Court will set maximum limits on contingent fees.
Many other states have already done so. In Saucier v. Hayes Dairy,
cited supra, the supreme court did hold that a fee of thirty-three and
one third percent was reasonable where the personal injury action had
been carried to completion. In Williams v. NOPSI,30 the court was faced
with a fifty percent contingent fee in a case where a young boy was
seriously injured when struck by a New Orleans public service bus. His
mother signed a fifty percent contingency fee agreement with the attorney
and later, when a tutor was appointed by the court, the tutor also
signed such an agreement. The matter was ultimately settled for $450,000
and the attorney then by an ex parte order had the fifty percent con-
tingency fee agreement approved. The tutor by declaratory judgment
then sought to set aside the contingent fee contract as he had not
knowingly signed it. In addition, he contended that such a fee was
basically unethical. The trial court, having approved the fee by ex parte
order, held the matter was res judicata and dismissed the plaintiff's
declaratory action. The court of appeal reversed and remanded the trial
court's judgment holding that the matter had never been satisfactorily
adjudicated and that a hearing was necessary to determine the validity
and fairness of the contingency fee agreement. In many instances, where
liability is not an issue, it Would appear to the writer that the normal
fees of twenty-five percent out of court and thirty-three and one third
29. 329 So. 2d 437 (La. 1976).
30. 544 So. 2d I I (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
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percent in court might be unreasonable. In addition, where the recovery
is exceedingly large these normal, everyday contingent fees might also
be unreasonable.
Effective Assistance of Counsel
As pointed out in State v. Robinson," a claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel necessarily requires an inquiry into mixed questions of
law and fact. Usually a reviewing court will not review an issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal unless the record dis-
closes the necessary evidence to decide the issue and the alleged inef-
fectiveness is raised on appeal by assignment of error. When the record
does not disclose the necessary evidence to decide the issue, the claim
will be more properly raised in a post-conviction writ in the trial court
where the district judge can order a full evidentiary hearing.
Where the record is complete enough or if it is in an evidentiary
hearing, the test for effectiveness of counsel is two-pronged: first, the
defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient, that
counsel made errors so serious that he was not functioning as counsel
guaranteed by the sixth amendment, and, second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense by showing
that the counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of
a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. This test, of course, springs
from the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington.12
In State v. Ball,33 counsel in the trial court failed to object to an
erroneous jury charge, apparently because he was not sufficiently knowl-
edgeable concerning the elements of the crime. In addition, in addressing
the jury himself, he misstated the necessary elements of attempted second
degree murder. The conviction was reversed and the matter remanded.
Virtually the same mistake was made in State v. Carter,3 4 wherein the
defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's repeated statements
during closing arguments that defendant could be. convicted of attempted
second degree murder if he had intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harm. The inclusion of the phrase "or to inflict great bodily harm" in
an instruction for attempted second degree murder is reversible error.
Accordingly, the court found counsel ineffective and reversed and re-
manded.
31. 549 So. 2d 1282 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989).
32. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267, 104 S. Ct. 3562
(1984).
33. 554 So. 2d 114 (La. App. 2d,Cir. 1989).
34. 559 So. 2d 539 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
1990]
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In State v. Willie," the defendant contended he was denied effective
counsel because of an actual conflict of interest that existed between
him and his trial attorney. This conflict arose out of the fact that his
trial attorney had been convicted of a federal offense and had received
a three-year suspended sentence, one of the conditions of probation
being performance of 416 hours of community service. The attorney's
appointment to represent the defendant was in partial fulfillment of the
community service; however, neither the attorney nor the trial court ever
advised the defendant of these facts. The defendant contended that only
conflict-free counsel could have properly questioned the jurors on voir
dire whether their attitude toward the defendant would be affected by
their knowledge that the person who had confessed to the murder was
being represented by a convicted felon who was appointed by the court
as part of his obligation to perform community service.
The majority of the court held that the ineffective assistance claim
warranted an evidentiary hearing and therefore the court conditionally
affirmed both the conviction and the sentence but remanded the case
to the district court on the ineffective assistance claim. Justices Cole
and Marcus dissented, contending that the record disclosed sufficient
evidence to decide the ineffective assistance of counsel question. They
would have decided it against the defendant because in their opinion
there was no basis for an ineffective assistance claim simply because an
attorney was convicted of an unrelated crime in a separate court system.
In Faretta v. California,36 the Court said:
There can be no blinking the fact that the right of an accused
to conduct his own defense seems to cut against the grain of
this Court's decisions holding that the Constitution requires that
no accused can be convicted and imprisoned unless he has been
accorded the right to the assistance of counsel. For it is surely
true that the basic thesis of those decisions is that the help of
a lawyer is essential to assure the defendant a fair trial. And
a strong argument can surely be made that the whole thrust of
those decisions most [sic] inevitably lead to the conclusion that
a State may constitutionally impose a lawyer upon even an
unwilling defendant.
But it is one thing to hold that every defendant, rich or
poor, has the right to the assistance of counsel, and quite another
to say that a State may compel a defendant to accept a lawyer
he does not want. 7
35. 559 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1990).
36. 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975).
37. Id. at 832-33, 95 S. Ct. at 2540 (citations omitted).
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In State v. Thompson,38 the defendant contended that the appoint-
ment of a standby counsel interfered with his right to represent himself
and therefore his conviction should be reversed. The court found, how-
ever, from the record that the defendant had been allowed to control
the organization and content of his own defense, make motions, argue
points of law, question witnesses, and address the court and jury at
appropriate points in the trial. Further, the record revealed the defense
counsel did not interrupt or give uninvited involvement while the de-
fendant was presenting his case. Accordingly, the court found no in-
terference with the defendant's right to defend himself pro se.
Discipline
Louisiana now has 15,000 lawyers. Prior to the recent changes in
disciplinary procedures which will be discussed below, the Louisiana
State Bar Association was receiving approximately 2,000 complaints an-
nually. This may be only the tip of the iceberg, as many disgruntled
clients never take the trouble to make a formal complaint. The cases
which are reported in the Southern Reporter represent only a small
portion of the complaints received and usually concern the most serious
complaints. A look at the decisions during the past year, shows that
commingling and conversion of clients' funds, neglecting the legal affairs
of clients, and failure to account properly to them are predominant
causes for suspension and disbarment of Louisiana attorneys.3 9 Failing
to refund unearned fees, 4° improper solicitation,'41 entering into business
transaction with a client to the client's disadvantage, 42 and lying to
clients concerning their legal affairs43 were some of the other charges
made against attorneys and sustained.
It is known that alcohol and drug abuse by attorneys has contributed
to some of the acts of professional misconduct which occur year after
year. In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Dumaine," the Louisiana
Supreme Court endorsed the work of the Louisiana State Bar Association
38. 544 So. 2d 421 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 550 So. 2d 626 (1989).
39. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Martin, 559 So. 2d 483'(La. 1990); Louisiana State
Bar Ass'n v. Jones, 555 So. 2d 1375 (La. 1990); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Riley, 555
So. 2d 984 (La. 1990); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Lindsay, 553 So. 2d 807 (La. 1989);
Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Kilgarlin, 550 So. 2d 600 (La. 1989); Louisiana State Bar
Ass'n v. Perez, 550 So. 2d 188 (La. 1989); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Young, 545 So.
2d 1018 (La. 1989); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Pasquier, 545 So. 2d 1014 (La. 1989);
Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Chatelain, 545 So. 2d 1000 (La. 1989).
40. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Carpenter, 553 So. 2d 855 (La. 1989).
41. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. St. Romain, 560 So. 2d 820 (La. 1990).
42. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Dickens, 550 So. 2d 180 (La. 1989).
43. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Roussel, 545 So. 2d 989 (La. 1989).
44. 550 So. 2d 1197 (La. 1989).
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and its Committee on Alcohol and Drug Abuse. Clearly, the court feels
that solving the alcohol and drug abuse problem through a confidential
assistance program would be a first step toward reducing the acts of
professional misconduct which are directly related thereto.
In Dumaine, the court recognized that lawyers in general are more
at risk for various types of impairments, particularly alcohol abuse,
than the general population. Stress is certainly one of the causes for
this imbalance. Lawyers are in an adversary business which subjects
them to many deadlines and places great responsibilities on their shoul-
ders. Another cause, which tends to aggravate the first, is lack of
economic return. The writer believes that many of the unprofessional
acts of attorneys are brought on more by what the lawyer considers
economic necessity than by any blindness toward or misunderstanding
of ethical rules.
Occasionally, however, the ethical rules are confusing. Take, for
instance, a proper handling of fee advances. According to the ABA/
BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct, the majority view is
that fee advances are the property of the client that must be deposited
in a trust account until earned. The minority view is that the ownership
of such funds passes to the attorney when he receives them and to put
them into a trust account would be a violation of. the prohibition of
commingling of attorney and client funds. In three fairly recent cases
the Louisiana Supreme Court clarified the rules for the Louisiana law-
yers. 45 The court said:
[t]he determination whether a fee paid in advance of services is
classified as the client's funds or as the attorney's funds turns
on the purpose of the payment. A retainer which secures the
attorney's general availability to the client and which is not
related to the fee for a particular representation constitutes the
attorney's funds and need not be placed in a trust account. On
the other hand, an advanced fee for particular services not yet
performed constitutes funds of the client which should be placed
in a trust account and not withdrawn or withheld without the
consent of the client.46
In Tucker, Justice Dennis took issue with this conclusion because it
tends to treat law firms differently depending on whether they usually
charge general retainers or retainers for specific pieces of business. On
rehearing in Tucker, Justice Lemmon stated that the court is in the
process of implementing a committee study to recommend an amendment
45. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Tucker, 560 So. 2d 435 (La. 1989); Louisiana State
Bar Ass'n v. Williams, 512 So. 2d 404 (La. 1987), Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Fish,
562 So. 2d 892 (La. 1990).
46. Williams, 512 So. 2d at 408-09.
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to the disciplinary rules regarding the handling of retainers in advance
fees. In the meantime, it would seem advisable for attorneys to recognize
that there is no such thing as a nonrefundable retainer, that general
retainers to insure the attorney's availability may be put in the firm
account, and that all other advance fees should be placed in a. trust
account until such time as they are fully earned.
The new Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement which went
into effect on April 1, 1990, very closely follow the format and language
of the Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement adopted by
the ABA House of Delegates in August of 1989. First, the court repealed
article 15 of the Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar
Association, thereby taking away from the bar all of the procedures
for discipline except for the responsibility for a $350,000 annual payment
to the clerk of the supreme court to defray partially the expenses of
the agency which is created under the rules. The agency consists of a
state-wide board to be composed of nine members, hearing committees,
disciplinary counsel, and a staff.
Three of the board's members shall be public members, that is, not
lawyers, and each hearing committee consisting of three persons shall
consist of one public member. There is no limit on the number of
hearing committees, although there must .be at least three. The organ-
ization is much like the court system. The hearing committee is the trial
court, the board acts as the intermediate appellate court, and the supreme
court will still be the final arbiter. The proceeding in the hearing com-
mittee will be transcribed and the respondent attorney shall have all of
his due process rights. The board will perform appellate review functions,
consisting of review of the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendations of hearing committees with respect to formal charges,
petitions for transfer to and from disability inactive status, and petitions
for reinstatement. It will prepare and forward to the supreme court its
own findings, if any, and recommendations together with the records
of the proceedings before the hearing committee.
The types of sanctions have been increased with the addition of
admonition and probation. One of the most important changes is that
immediately upon the filing of formal charges with the board by the
disciplinary counsel, the matter shall become public. The complete text
of the rule may be found in West's Louisiana Session Law Service 1990,
No. 1. It is estimated that the new system will cost $900,000 per year
with the Louisiana State Bar Association paying $350,000 and the re-
mainder of the money coming from an annual court assessment on
attorneys. Lawyers who have practiced for three years will pay $45.00
a year and lawyers who have practiced less than three years will be
assessed a $25.00 charge.
All members of the board shall be appointed by the supreme court,
including the public members. Members of each hearing committee are
19901
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appointed by the board. It will be interesting to see if the new procedure
will solve some of the complaints mentioned in the introduction to this
article. The only difficulty which the writer can see at this moment will
be the inability of the board to keep up with the decisions coming from
the various hearing committees. It must be remembered that the board
members are not compensated and six of them are practicing attorneys.
In addition, it does not appear that the board can break into panels
because it can act only with the concurrence of a majority, which would
be five.
One other problem surfaced in the annual convention of the Louis.
iana State Bar Association. A resolution was submitted to reduce the
annual dues of members from $100.00 to $55.00, thus the total outlay
of the lawyer would be the same: $55.00 to the State Bar Association
and $45.00 to the clerk of the supreme court. The resolution was tabled,
but it is easy to anticipate that it will surface again.
There is some concern also that the "integrated bar" may be in
danger. The latest decision of the United States Supreme Court, Keller
v. State Bar of California,47 held that a state bar may constitutionally
use mandatory membership dues to fund activities germane to goals of
regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services,
but it may not use dues to fund activities of ideological or political
nature. One of the principal activities of the bar in the past has been
discipline and although the direct expense of discipline is not broken
down in the 1989 annual report of the Louisiana State Bar Association,
one may assume it was fairly large. Of course, the bar still has its
committee on admissions, its clients' security fund committee, its con-
tinuing legal education program, and many special committees which
continually work for the betterment of the legal profession.
Conflict of Interests
Except for State v. Willie, discussed above, the only significant
conflict of interests case is La Nasa v. Fortier.48 In this case, a partner
in an accounting firm and the accounting firm itself was sued by a
former client of the partner. A law firm was retained by the accounting
firm and facts indicated that the lawyer assigned to the case may have
begun representing both the accounting firm and the partner. Later the
attorney notified the partner that he was representing only the accounting
firm and not the partner individually. The partner then sought to dis-
qualify the attorney and his firm alleging that the attorney, in the course
of representing him, had conducted extensive interviews with him, the
47. 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990).
48. 553 So. 2d 1022 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989), writ denied, 559 So. 2d 124 (1990).
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partner, and obtained all of his personal documents which included
documents having to do exclusively with his personal exposure predating
his affiliation with the accounting firm.
After a full evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the motion
for disqualification finding that an attorney-client relationship did exist
between the lawyer and the accounting partner but that no privileged
information had been disclosed. The disqualification was based on the
need to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.
The appellate court also found that an attorney-client relationship
had existed, citing Louisiana State Bar Association v. Bosworth,49 wherein
it was held that the existence of such a relationship turns upon the
client's subjective belief that the attorney-client relationship exists. The
court went on to conclude, however, that the harsh remedy of dis-
qualification was not called for in this case because there was no
expectation by the accounting partner that the information which he
gave to the attorney would not be imparted to the accounting firm.
Apparently, all of the disclosures were made for the benefit of both
parties, and consequently, no conflict of interest was present and the
attorney will be permitted to continue his representation of the accounting
firm itself.
The old "appearance of impropriety" which was formerly contained
in Canon Nine of the Code of Professional Responsibility has not been
carried over into the model rules. Most courts, particularly the federal
courts, have abandoned it as a test and have adopted a less broad
disqualification standard which would permit continued representation
unless the attorney's conduct would "taint the trial" by disturbing the
balance of representation in one of two ways: lessening the attorney's
vigor or possessing privileged information from a prior representation.50
Conclusion
If the number of lawyers in Louisiana continues to increase, more
and more of them predictably will suffer from an inability to keep up
financially with "the Joneses." The stress which this brings on may
very well lead to additional drug and alcohol abuse. Inevitably, the
abuse leads to incompetent and unprofessional service. One can only
hope that the Louisiana Supreme Court and the Louisiana State Bar
Association working together will find a solution to this vexing problem.
49. 481 So. 2d 567 (La. 1986).
50. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979).
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